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In this work we suggest to model the dynamics of power grids in terms of a two-layer network,
and use the Italian high voltage power grid as a proof-of-principle example. The first layer in
our model represents the power grid consisting of generators and consumers, while the second
layer represents a dynamic communication network that serves as a controller of the first layer.
In particular, the dynamics of the power grid is modelled by the Kuramoto model with inertia,
while the communication layer provides a control signal P ci for each generator to improve frequency
synchronization within the power grid. We propose different realizations of the communication
layer topology and different ways to calculate the control signal. Then we conduct a systematic
survey of the two-layer system against a multitude of different realistic perturbation scenarios, such
as disconnecting generators, increasing demand of consumers, or generators with stochastic power
output. When using a control topology that allows all generators to exchange information, we find
that a control scheme aimed to minimize the frequency difference between adjacent nodes operates
very efficiently even against the worst scenarios with the strongest perturbations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Global warming, the growing world population and
power demand, with a subsequent increase in carbon
power emissions, have provoked governments and energy
utilities to take solid steps towards the use of renew-
able energies [1] and their integration within the exist-
ing power transmission and distribution systems, thus
challenging scientific and technological research towards
the goal of increasing the efficiency and flexibility of the
power system [2–5]. The existing power grid was de-
veloped using a centralistic approach, therefore we have
a few very high-power ac plants operating at 50 or 60
Hz interconnected by ac or dc transmission systems op-
erating at very high voltages (e.g., 400 kV) and many
substations, where the high voltage is transformed to the
distribution level (e.g., 20 kV). In order to distribute the
power in a capillary way, a huge number of distribution
lines is present, supplying the loads directly (in the case
of high-power loads) or after voltage transformation in
the case of residential or low-power industrial loads (e.g.,
400 V in Europe). Recently, renewable energy genera-
tors, which produce a few kilowatts in the case of resi-
dential photovoltaic systems, up to some megawatts in
the case of large photovoltaic and wind generators, have
become widely dispersed around the world, thus trans-
forming the present power system into a large-scale dis-
tributed generation system incorporating thousands of
generators, characterized by different technologies, volt-
age, current, and power levels, as well as topologies [6, 7].
Hence, their integration with the existing network is fun-
damentally changing the whole electrical power system
∗ corresponding author: schoell@physik.tu-berlin.de
[3, 8]: the drawback of renewable energy power plants
is that their output is subject to environmental fluctua-
tions outside of human control, i.e., clouds blocking the
sun or lack of wind, and these fluctuations emerge on
all timescales displaying non-Gaussian behaviour [9, 10].
In addition, these issues are further complicated by the
aging infrastructure of the existing power grid, which al-
ready cause problems to utilities and customers, provid-
ing low power quality at increasing cost. In particular the
power grid infrastructure is very critical and contains a
large number of interconnected components: generators,
power transformers, and distribution feeders that are ge-
ographically spread. Moreover, its increasing complexity
and geographical spread, and the side effects caused by
the high penetration of renewable, stochastically fluctu-
ating energy generators make it very vulnerable, both
from the point of view of required sophisticated security
mechanisms [11] and from the point of view of dynamic
stability, since renewable sources are usually employed
by microgrids in isolated modes to maintain their capa-
bility of connecting and disconnecting from the grid [12].
Due to the design of the current power grid as a central-
ized system where the electric power flows unidirectional
through transmission and distribution lines from power
plants to the customer, the control is concentrated in
central locations and only partially in substations, while
remote ends, like loads, are almost or totally passive.
Therefore it is necessary to design new systems that pro-
vide more effective and widely distributed intelligent con-
trol embedded in local electricity production, two-way
electricity and information flows, thus achieving flexible,
efficient, economic, and secure power delivery [13].
The new approach, widely known as Smart Grid [14],
requires both a complex two-way communication infra-
structure, sustaining power flow between intelligent com-
ponents, and sophisticated computing and information
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2technologies, as well as business applications. The new
approach will include grid energy storage, needed for load
balancing and for overcoming energy fluctuations caused
by the intrinsic nature of renewable energy sources, in
addition to preventing widespread power grid cascading
failures [15, 16]. In particular, control is needed in power
networks in order to assure stability and to avoid power
breakdowns or cascading failures: one of the most impor-
tant control goals is the preservation of synchronization
within the whole power grid. Control mechanisms able to
preserve synchronization are ordered by their time scale
on which they act: the first second of the disturbance is
mainly uncontrolled, and in this case a power plant will
unexpectedly shut down with a subsequent shortage of
power in the system, energy is drawn from the spinning
reserve of the generators. Within the next seconds, the
primary control sets on to stabilize the frequency and to
prevent a large drop. Finally, to restore the frequency
back to its nominal value of 50 (or 60) Hertz, secondary
control is necessary. In many recent studies on power
system dynamics and stability, the effects of control are
completely neglected or only primary control is consid-
ered [17–22]. This control becomes less feasible if the
percentage of renewable power plants increases, due to
their reduced inertia [23, 24]. Few studies are devoted to
secondary control [25–27] and to time-delayed feedback
control [28–30].
The aim of this work is to investigate the controllabil-
ity of power networks subject to different kinds of per-
turbations and to develop novel control concepts con-
sidering the communication infrastructure present in the
smart grid. Few works have included the communica-
tion layer into the synchronization of power networks.
Even though the communication infrastructure plays an
important role in control and synchronization, prelimi-
nary works [31, 32] assume trivial networks, without dis-
connected nodes, which, however, is of great importance
in stabilizing smart grids, due to the necessity of syn-
chronizing grids with isolated generators, microgrids, or
even coupled microgrids that can be connected or dis-
connected to the main grid at any time. Moreover, the
inclusion of a communication infrastructure has added
new challenges in control and stability [33], where com-
munication constraints emerge, e.g., time-delays, packet
losses, sampling and data rate, among others, but, up to
now, attention has focussed on sampling problems in or-
der to assure that synchronization is independent on the
sampling period [34].
In this paper we consider a two-layer network in a full
dynamic description. It consists of a power grid layer
and a communication layer, which provides the control
for the power grid. Each layer is governed by its own dy-
namics, which is dependent upon the state of the other
layer. In particular the physical topology that relates
the interconnection of distributed generators and loads
is described by coupled Kuramoto phase oscillators with
inertia, closely related to the swing equations [35], while
the communication topology, which describes the infor-
mation flow of the power system control measurements,
depends on the information of the neighbors of each node
[34]. Starting from the ideal synchronized state, we in-
vestigate the effect of multiple different perturbations to
which the system is subject, modelling real threats to
synchronization of the network, e.g., failure of nodes, in-
creased consumer demand, power plants with stochasti-
cally fluctuating output. For each perturbation different
setups of the communication layer are tested to find an
effective control strategy that successfully preserves fre-
quency synchronization against all applied perturbations.
As a proof of concept the Italian high voltage power grid
has been considered. The same two-layer topology has
been already investigated in [36] to understand how local-
ized events can present a severe danger to the stability
of the whole power grid, by causing a cascade of fail-
ures, but without considering the dynamics of the con-
trol nodes. Here the focus of our investigation is on the
interdependence of the communication network and the
power grid: Random failure of a power plant causes the
malfunction of connected elements in the communication
layer. Communication nodes isolated due to the failure
become inert, causing generators connected to them to
shut down as well as eventually leading to a far-reaching
blackout. In short, our proposed control techniques pre-
serve synchronization for different perturbations, thus
demonstrating the powerful perspectives of our control
approach which considers synchronization of power sys-
tems based on the coupled dynamics of the smart grid
architecture and the communication infrastructure.
II. RESULTS
A. Typical perturbation patterns
Applying a sufficiently strong perturbation to the syn-
chronized state of the network causes a loss of full fre-
quency synchronization. Due to the elongated structure
of the Italian power grid, the main pattern emerging in
this case is the desynchronization between the northern
and southern parts. A typical example of this event is
illustrated in Fig. 1 (a), where the perturbation pattern
following increasing demand in a single node is shown.
The unperturbed nominal intrinsic frequency is normal-
ized to zero. In particular, as a consequence of the ap-
plied perturbation, nodes in the northern part of the net-
work (nodes approximately with index i ≤ 70) adopt a
slightly higher positive frequency, while frequencies re-
lated to the nodes in the southern part shift to negative
values. This is due to the unbalanced distribution of
generators in the network: The southern part of the grid
possesses a higher ratio of loads (11 generators and 46
loads), while the northern part contains a higher ratio
of generators (23 generators and 47 loads). Therefore,
when frequency synchronization between the two parts
of the power grid is lost, they adopt the mean frequency
of their subgroup (ϑ˙north ≈ 0.23 and ϑ˙north ≈ −0.28 re-
3FIG. 1. Typical desynchronization pattern emerging due to the application of perturbations without control. Here the demand
of load i = 120 is increased to Ωpert = −3 for the duration of the perturbation Tp = 1000 from t = 200 to t = 1200, marked by
dashed lines. (a) Space-time plot of the whole Italian power grid. Colour indicates the frequencies of the nodes, whose values
are reported in the corresponding colour scale on the right. The nominal intrinsic frequency is normalized to zero. (b) Mean
frequency of the nodes during the time of perturbation 〈ωi〉Tp . Blue (red) nodes identify generators (loads). (c) Standard
deviation of the ensemble frequency ∆ω vs time. Coupling strength K = 6.5, inertial mass m = 10, bimodal frequency (power)
distribution Ωload = −1 and Ωgen = 9334 . Integration time step ∆t = 0.002.
spectively). The boundary between the southern and the
northern part is identifiable when looking at the node fre-
quencies, averaged over the perturbation time Tp. Slight
fluctuations are present across the whole network, as in-
dicated by the error bars in Fig. 1 (b), while fluctuations
become stronger near the boundary of the two parts of
the grid, i.e., for i ∈ [60, 90].
Moreover, as a consequence of the increasing demand
(single node perturbation), we observe a macroscopic re-
action of the network, whose standard deviation of the
frequency increases drastically and oscillates in time (see
Fig. 1 (c)).
Finally, a single node perturbation can cause the desta-
bilization of a distant node, e.g., fluctuations often cause
generators near the boundary between north and south to
desynchronize. Especially susceptible are the generators
i = 71, 76, which are located as dead-ends along the cen-
tral connection between the northern and southern part.
An example of generator i = 76 being desynchronized,
as a result of perturbing a remote load, is illustrated in
Fig. 1 (b).
In summary, perturbation patterns are multiple and di-
versified, as will be shown in detail and more system-
atically in the following sections, where different ap-
plied perturbations are considered. In particular detailed
space-time plots showing all the perturbation patterns
are shown in the Supplemental Material [37]. Therefore
it is necessary to design a proper control scheme which is
able to cope with different scenarios, via a rapid exchange
of information, and this is achieved by the communica-
tion layer which we will introduce in order to effect con-
trol.
B. Disconnecting nodes
First, we systematically investigate the effect of discon-
necting a generator on the synchronization of the network
by targeting each generator in the network individually.
The generator i is disconnected from the power grid and
the communication layer as defined in the Methods Sec-
tion IV.D for the duration of Tp = 1000 time units. The
perturbation affects the grid depending on the topology:
it turns out that nodes in the southern part of the net-
work are particularly vulnerable to selected disconnec-
tion, while the power provided by the generators in the
northern part can easily be replaced by the power of the
others when disconnected. If no control is applied to the
generators, the network loses synchronization, as soon
as any generator in the southern part of the network is
targeted by this perturbation. Fig. 2 shows the Italian
high voltage power grid with 34 generators and 93 loads.
In particular in Fig. 2 (a) the boundary is indicated at
which desynchronization is observed: only below the or-
ange line, the targeted disconnection results in loss of
synchronization. Vulnerability to other kinds of pertur-
bations in shown in (b) (intermittent noise applied to a
generator) and (c) (instantaneous increase in demand of
a load).
If any generator in the southern, peninsular part is dis-
connected, it causes not only the southern part, but also
the northern, continental part of the network to desyn-
chronize as a natural consequence. If any of the north-
ern generators is targeted, this generator returns to its
natural frequency Ωgen due to inertia, as it is no longer
connected to any other node in the network, while the
rest of the network remains generally unaffected by the
disconnection. The only exception to this is given by gen-
erator i = 37, close to the northern border of the power
grid, at the border with Switzerland. When this genera-
tor is disconnected, the perturbation causes node i = 36
to become isolated from the rest of the power grid since
it is directly connected only to node i = 37, thus the
entire dead tree desynchronizes. Another singular exam-
ple is generator i = 121. The disconnection of this node
causes Sicily to become isolated from the main part of the
power grid. During the isolation both the main part of
4FIG. 2. Map of the Italian high voltage power grid with 34 generators and 93 loads. Generators are marked by red dots, while
blue dots indicate loads. For the numbering of the nodes refer to the Supplemental Material [37]. Frequency synchronization of
the network is vulnerable to disruption of nodes depending on their location and the type of perturbation: (a) Disconnection
of any generator below the orange line is critical to the frequency synchronization of the whole power grid. (b) Applying
intermittent noise to any generator outside the orange circle is critical to frequency synchronization. (c) Instantaneous increase
in demand of any load below the orange line is critical to frequency synchronization.
the power grid and the Sicilian subset remain frequency
synchronized within themselves, but after the connection
is restored, the isolated part is unable to resynchronize
with the main part of the grid without control.
In the following we show that control of the genera-
tors during the perturbation is able to counteract the
desynchronization, and we analyze which of the control
schemes are more effective than others. We study three
different control functions as detailed in the Methods Sec-
tion: (i) difference control, (ii) direct control, (iii) com-
bined control of both. When the topology of the con-
trolling communication layer is chosen identical to the
power grid layer (Fig. 3 (a)), we observe that difference
control turns out to be less effective in counteracting the
perturbation than the other two control schemes, direct
and combined control, which offer the same effectiveness.
This occurs due to the properties of the control schemes.
For example, difference control only preserves frequency
synchronization locally, but due to a lack of connections
between the northern and southern part of the power
grid, this scheme is only able to stabilize both parts of the
network separately, while their mutual frequency desyn-
chronization remains. When additional links between
the northern and southern part of the network are intro-
duced in the control layer (Fig. 3 (b)), difference control
becomes able to restore full frequency synchronization
within the network, albeit with a nonzero offset due to
the missing generator, as discussed below.
For direct control the behavior is the opposite. When
additional links are present in the communication layer
between the generators in the northern and southern part
(right column), this scheme becomes inert, as the mean
frequency within the vicinity of each generator is iden-
tical to the nominal frequency of the network. Without
additional links, however, this control scheme is able to
restore the nominal frequency of the network in the vicin-
ity of each generator and thus in the whole network (left
column). The combined control always operates closely
to the more effective of the two control schemes (differ-
ence control, direct control).
Note that the presence of a nonzero offset in the mean
standard frequency deviation, when 〈∆ω〉Tp is plotted as
a function of the targeted node, has been artificially intro-
duced by the performed numerical procedure, since the
standard deviation is calculated considering all nodes in
the network, including the disconnected generator. Be-
cause it is disconnected, the frequency of this generator
returns to its natural frequency Ωgen. As a consequence
the ensemble standard deviation of frequencies of the
power grid is non-zero, even if the rest of the network
is fully frequency-synchronized.
C. Applying intermittent noise to generators
A characteristic feature of renewable energy sources
are power fluctuations due to fluctuating wind and so-
lar irradiation (clouds). This requires novel design con-
cepts and theoretical investigations into smart storage
control strategies to balance feed-in variations and miti-
5FIG. 3. Control of frequency synchronization for different
perturbations targeting a single node: Mean standard devia-
tion of frequency during the time of perturbation 〈∆ω〉Tp vs
the index i of the targeted node. The symbols indicate dif-
ferent control schemes. Blue squares: no control. Red trian-
gles: difference control. Yellow circles: direct control. Green
diamonds: combined control. Control strength: G = 0.04.
The two columns show different control layer topologies: The
left column shows the simple setup (clocij ) of the control layer,
where generators possess the same connections as in the power
grid layer, and the right column shows a control layer topol-
ogy (cextij ) where additional links between all generators are
present. The four rows indicate different types of perturba-
tions: (a),(b): Disconnecting nodes using (a) clocij , (b) c
ext
ij .
(c),(d): Intermittent noise with parameters µ = Ωgen, σx =
1
3
,
I = 2, h(f) = f−
5
3 , g = 0.5, z0 = 2, γ = 1 using (c) c
loc
ij ,
(d) cextij . (e),(f): White noise with
√
2D = 5.0 using (e) clocij ,
(f) cextij . (g),(h): Increasing load demand to Ωpert = −3 using
(g) clocij , (h) c
ext
ij .
gate power quality problems induced by stochastic fluc-
tuations. A particular challenge for stable power grid op-
eration is given by wind- and solar-induced fluctuations,
which follow characteristic non-Gaussian statistics over
a broad band of time scales from seasonal and diurnal
imbalances down to short-term fluctuations on the scale
of seconds and sub-seconds [38]. The turbulent charac-
ter of wind feed-in, and in particular its intermittency, is
directly transferred into frequency and voltage fluctua-
tions, as shown in [39], where the main characteristics of
real wind feed-in were captured by generating intermit-
tent time series on the basis of a Langevin-type model
and imposing a realistic power spectrum. In the follow-
ing we apply intermittent noise, generated as in [39], and
we systematically investigate the effect of applying noise
to each individual generator. For the detailed description
of the perturbation procedure see Sec. IV D. In particu-
lar, for the stochastic term ΩN (t) we use intermittent
noise with high intermittency strength I = 2. The value
of the intermittent noise x(t) is restricted to −1 ≤ x ≤ 1
and the penetration parameter µ = Ωgen is chosen identi-
cal to the power output of each generator, to prevent any
generator from acting as a load and giving a maximum
power feed-in to the network.
When the perturbation is applied systematically to each
individual generator in the network in the absence of
control, we observe that the whole network always
loses synchronization, irrespectively of the targeted node
(Fig. 3 (c), (d)). Due to the perturbation, the frequencies
of the southern part of the network usually start fluctuat-
ing with slightly negative frequencies, while the frequen-
cies of the northern part fluctuate correspondingly with
slightly positive frequencies. This behavior emerges dur-
ing the perturbation and remains even after the pertur-
bation ends. However generators do not usually desyn-
chronize from the rest of the power grid, apart from a few
cases (i.e., nodes i=86, 115), which correspond to dead
ends. Moreover fluctuations affect the network with a dif-
ferent timing, depending on the topological location: if a
node belonging to the southern part of the network is tar-
geted, the network loses synchronization almost immedi-
ately; if a node belonging to the north-western part of the
power grid is targeted, the power grid eventually loses fre-
quency synchronization after some time t ∼ Tp/2. Only
the generators in the north-eastern part of the power grid
(i = 39, 40, 49, 52, 56, 68, 69) remain resilient as high-
lighted in Fig. 2 (b).
In Fig. 3 (c), (d) the ability of the different control
schemes to preserve frequency synchronization in the
presence of the perturbation is illustrated. We observe
similar behavior as in the case of disconnected single gen-
erators: difference control is only effective in counter-
acting the perturbation if additional links between the
generators are present in the communication layer, while
direct control is only effective in the absence of addi-
tional connections. In particular, when applying differ-
ence control to a sparse control network (i.e. generators
in the control layer are connected just to their direct
neighbors), the underlying power grid is unable to re-
cover full frequency synchronization after the perturba-
tion ends, since the frequency shift between the northern
and the southern parts remains unchanged. If the gener-
ators in the control layer are globally connected, full fre-
quency synchronization is always achieved after the end
of the perturbation with difference control, except if node
i = 73 is perturbed: in this case short-living fluctuations
emerge, on a time t ∼ 150; they possess an intensity of
∆ω ∼ 0.2. On the other hand, the application of direct
control to a local control layer topology allows for the
achievement of full frequency synchronization at the end
of the perturbation. Moreover full frequency synchro-
nization is mostly retained even during the perturbation,
irrespectively of short-living fluctuations comprising the
whole network that emerge for a time t ∼ 100. When
direct control is applied to the extended control layer
topology, the frequency synchronization is not retained
during the perturbation and a frequency shift between
the northern and southern parts emerges. Finally, com-
bined control is as effective as the more efficient of its
6two components depending on topology, as the ineffec-
tive component is mostly inactive.
D. Applying Gaussian white noise to generators
In the previous section we have investigated the im-
pact of short-term wind fluctuations on the basis of a
Kuramoto-like power grid model, considering stability in
terms of frequency desynchronization. In this section we
compare intermittent feed-in with Gaussian white noise,
and investigate the impact of uncorrelated noise upon the
generators. In particular each generator is perturbed by
applying Gaussian white noise with intensity
√
2D = 5.0
(for the implementation of noise in the dynamical equa-
tions, see Sec. IV D).
If white noise is applied to each generator individually
we observe a general vulnerability of the network, in-
dependently of the perturbed node (see Fig. 3 (e), (f)).
Without control, the network is usually unable to recover
after the perturbation, and frequency desynchronization
between the northern and southern part of the power
grid occurs. Generally, the desynchronization is stronger
than for intermittent noise (c, d). Almost all genera-
tors are vulnerable except for a few resilient ones (i.e.,
i = 3, 18, 30, 36, 49, 56, 68, 69), which are located in the
northern part of the grid, though not located closely to-
gether. If one of these resilient nodes is targeted, the per-
turbation only causes long-time frequency fluctuations in
the neighborhood of the affected generator, while the re-
maining part of the network does not lose full frequency
synchronization.
If we implement the control strategy, as shown in
Fig. 3 (e), (f), we observe as before that without addi-
tional links between the generators, difference control
is unable to reliably restore synchronization within the
whole power grid (e). When links between all generators
are added (f), the control scheme becomes very effec-
tive in counteracting this perturbation. Likewise direct
control is only able to effectively ensure frequency syn-
chronization within the whole power grid in the absence
of additional links (e).
E. Increasing demand of loads
Perturbations can be applied not only to generators
but also to loads. In particular, we investigate the ef-
fect of instantaneously increasing the demand of a single
load upon the frequency synchronization of the network.
We apply this perturbation as defined in Sec. IV D by in-
creasing the demand of the individual load i by a factor
of three to Ωpert = −3.0, for the duration of the pertur-
bation, in order to represent sudden changes in consumer
behavior due to singular events.
The impact of increasing the demand of a single load
strongly depends upon the node location and we observe
a distinct topological separation between vulnerable and
resilient nodes. If any node in the northern part of the
network (i ≤ 72) is perturbed, the system remains un-
affected: all loads belonging to the northern part of the
power grid are resilient against the perturbation and the
network remains fully frequency synchronized. If any
load belonging to the southern part of the power grid
(i = 74 and i ≥ 77) is perturbed, frequency synchro-
nization across the power grid is lost. Moreover a shift
in frequencies develops between the northern and south-
ern part of the network, which is often accompanied by
the full desynchronization of a generator (i = 76) lo-
cated near the boundary between the two parts. A vi-
sualization of the boundary of the perturbation is shown
in Fig. 2 (c). A peculiar case is given by load i = 75: ir-
respectively of being already in the southern, peninsular
part, it is better connected to the northern part of the
grid than to the southern part, therefore it is not affected
by the increase of the demand and the system is able to
compensate the perturbation of this node. In general,
loads in the northern part of Italy have a larger connec-
tivity than those in the south, thus local circuits are able
to re-route the power flow and compensate for the single
node demand.
In Fig. 3 (g), (h) the impact of applying control to the sys-
tem is illustrated. We can clearly observe the resilience of
the nodes with the lower indices, which correspond to the
northern part of the power grid, whose perturbation does
not affect the frequency synchronization of the grid. As
before, we observe that difference control is ineffective
in restoring full frequency synchronization without the
presence of additional links in the communication layer
between the northern and southern part of the power
grid (g). However, if additional links are present differ-
ence control becomes very effective, while direct control
is unable to restore frequency synchronization within the
network (h). Combined control acts as effectively as the
better of its two components.
F. Perturbations targeting multiple generators
simultaneouly
In addition to targeting each individual generator in
the network with different perturbations, we will now
investigate the impact of targeting several generators si-
multaneously. For this purpose we will systematically in-
crease the number n of targeted generators. Generators
are perturbed successively from south to north along the
Italian grid: the perturbation first affects nodes in the
southern part of the network (characterized by higher
node index), and generators with decreasing node index
are added successively, one by one, to the list of the per-
turbed nodes. Thus the perturbation propagates from
the south to the north of Italy. Fig. 4 shows the impact
of applying different types of perturbations (similar to
Fig. 3 (a)- (f)) to an increasing number of generators with
and without control. Disconnection of nodes quickly de-
stroys synchronization in the network in absence of con-
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FIG. 4. Control of frequency synchronization for different
perturbations targeting multiple nodes: Mean standard devi-
ation of frequency during the time of perturbation 〈∆ω〉Tp vs
the number n of targeted nodes. The symbols indicate differ-
ent control schemes. Blue squares: no control. Red triangles:
difference control. Yellow circles: direct control. Green dia-
monds: direct control. Control strength G = 0.04. The two
columns show different control layer topologies, and the rows
depict different types of perturbations: (a),(b): Disconnect-
ing nodes using (a) clocij , (b) c
ext
ij . (c),(d): Intermittent noise
using (c) clocij , (d) c
ext
ij . (e),(f): White noise using (e) c
loc
ij , (f)
cextij . Parameters of the perturbations as in Fig. 3. Note the
different vertical scales.
trol due to the emergent strong fluctuations, as shown in
Fig. 4 (a), (b). In general, for n ≤ 13 the perturbation is
confined to the southern part of the grid, and results in
a frequency shift between the northern and the southern
part. For 14 ≤ n ≤ 25 the perturbation jumps over to
the continental north-eastern part of the network, while
for n > 25 the perturbation finally reaches the north-
western part of the network. A special situation arises
when generators i = 126, 121 are disconnected, corre-
sponding to n = 2: The disconnection of node 121 cuts
out a dead-tree composed of a chain of 6 nodes, thus iso-
lating Calabria and Sicily, but resulting in an ineffective
perturbation for the remaining grid. Note that since the
averaged frequency deviation includes a growing number
of disconnected nodes which oscillate at their natural fre-
quency Ωgen, it increases strongly with n, and hence the
overall improvement by the control is almost concealed on
the vertical scale shown. Nevertheless the node-resolved
data show that control is effective.
If intermittent noise is applied to multiple generators
(Fig. 4 (c), (d)), we generally observe a frequency shift
between northern and southern parts with stronger fluc-
tuations at the boundary of the two parts. When the
perturbation ends, the shift may persist, or single-node
desynchronization may occur. In particular if generators
close to the boundary are perturbed (i.e., i = 76, 71), for
11 ≤ n ≤ 15 the fluctuations across the network persist
after the end of the perturbation, and a single generator
desynchronizes, i = 71. The remaining network recovers
frequency synchronization.
In case of Gaussian white noise (see Fig. 4 (e), (f)), we
observe that more and more nodes desynchronize from
the rest of the network and revert to their natural fre-
quencies, if the number of perturbed generators increases.
Moreover the loss of synchronization persists even after
the end of the perturbation. For n < 15 desynchroniza-
tion is confined to the southern part of the Italian grid
and a frequency shift between continental and peninsu-
lar parts can be observed. This means that we can safely
disconnect some generators from the north in addition
to all generators from the south, and still the desynchro-
nization will not spread to the north. For n ≥ 15, the
perturbation spreads to the northern part of the grid.
In particular, if the generator i = 58 is affected by the
noise, being located at the center of the northern part,
synchronization is completely lost and the whole network
is affected by the perturbation.
Now we discuss the different control strategies. We
observe, in contrast to the case where single generators
are targeted, that direct control is not reliably the most
effective control scheme in the absence of additional links
between the generators in the control layer. Especially
when applying intermittent noise to most generators in
the network (Fig. 4 (c), (d)) we observe that the mean
standard deviation is noticeable higher than for difference
control because neighboring generators are compensating
each other. If one generator adopts a negative frequency,
while the other has a positive frequency, direct control
will only ensure that their amplitudes are similar, as it
only acts to restore the mean frequency in the neighbor-
hood of the controlled node to the nominal frequency
of the network. The frequency deviation induced by the
perturbation is the larger, the more nodes are affected si-
multaneously. Thus the reliability of direct control dete-
riorates with the severity of the perturbation. In the case
of multiple generators connected in a chain, direct control
can even lead to runaway desynchronization, as the mid-
dle generator tries to compensate for its two neighbors
which in turn act to compensate for the middle genera-
tor.
Difference control by itself is ineffective in restoring syn-
chronization during the time of perturbation without ad-
ditional links between the generators in the communi-
cation layer, but it becomes very effective at preserving
frequency synchronization within the power grid, if all
generators are connected in the communication layer.
In the absence of additional links in the communication
layer, combined control is governed by the interplay of
its two components. The difference control is preventing
the direct control from stabilizing an equilibrium between
the generators that is far from frequency synchronization,
which greatly improves the effectiveness of merely direct
control. In the presence of additional links between the
generators in the communication layer the dynamics of
direct control is again mostly dominated by its difference
8control component.
G. Continuously increasing demand of all nodes
simultaneously
Now we consider a perturbation of loads, where all
loads increase simultaneously and continuously. This
models the effect of external events, such as additional
lighting needed during dusk or heat-induced usage of air-
conditioning. As detailed in Sec. IV D, each load in-
creases from Ωload = −1 at a constant rate over 1000
time units until a final value of Ωpert = −3 is reached
for all loads. The overall impact of the perturbation
is very strong, and the higher percentage of loads in
the southern part of the grid with respect to the north
plays a fundamental role in destabilizing the network (see
Fig. 5 (a), (b)). As a result of this perturbation, gener-
ators at the boundary between north and south are the
first to desynchronize, then fluctuations culminate in the
desynchronization of multiple generators in the northern
part. At this point the frequency shift between north
and south disappears and the network shows a negative
average mean frequency trying to compensate the desyn-
chronized generators that oscillate at high positive aver-
age frequency.
In Fig. 5 the effect of this perturbation on the frequency
synchronization of the network and the ability of the dif-
ferent control strategies to preserve frequency synchro-
nization are shown in more details. We clearly observe
FIG. 5. Control of frequency synchronization for continu-
ously increasing demand of all nodes: Standard deviation
of frequency ∆ω vs time, when the demand of all loads in
the network is simultaneously increased from Ωload = −1 to
Ωpert = −3, starting at t = 200. The final value is achieved at
t = 1200 marked by the dashed vertical line. Control strength
G = 0.04. The colours indicate different control schemes.
Blue: no control. Red: difference control, Yellow: direct con-
trol. Green: direct control. (a) and (b) show different control
layer topologies as in Fig. 3: (a) clocij , (b) c
ext
ij .
that the only control scheme able to improve the uncon-
trolled network is difference control.
Without additional communication links between the
generators, direct control fails due to severe frequency de-
viations introduced by the perturbation on a small subset
of generators in the northern part of the grid. Moreover
the desynchronization of these generators (i = 22, 57, 58)
is reinforced by the control scheme, as neighboring gen-
erators try to compensate the frequencies of the others
causing one of them to have increasingly negative fre-
quencies, while the other shows increasingly positive fre-
quencies. This can be mitigated by the introduction of
additional communication links between the generators
(b), but the control scheme still remains inefficient.
Combined control proves ineffective as well, regardless
of the investigated control topology. Combined control
has been designed as a combination of difference control
and direct control, but in this case the two components
are competing against each other, causing the frequen-
cies of the controlled generators to oscillate. Since the
mean frequency of the power grid is shifted away from the
nominal frequency due to the perturbation, direct control
generally tries to increase the output of the generators to
restore power balance, while the difference control gener-
ally tries to match the decreased frequency of the loads to
ensure frequency synchronization. This potential compe-
tition was non evident for the other perturbation schemes
since in all previous cases there was no strong overall de-
viation from power balance across the network.
H. Comparison of the control schemes
Difference control proves ineffective in the local
control topology clocij , because it is only able to improve
upon frequency synchronization locally. This is not
due to a general malfunctioning of the control scheme,
but rather to a limitation of the designed control in
achieving full frequency synchronization: the control
is always able to prevent lasting desynchronization of
a node from the remaining grid, but not to prevent
the desynchronization between the continental and
the peninsular part of the grid. This means that if a
perturbation causes the northern and southern part of
the network to lose synchronization, the control scheme
only suppresses local fluctuations in the northern and
southern part separately, but does not restore frequency
synchronization between the two parts of the power
grid: no generator is sufficiently connected to both parts
simultaneously to make the control scheme effective.
This shortcoming is removed when we consider the
extended control topology. In particular, when addi-
tional communication links are introduced in cextij , all
generators become well connected to both the northern
and southern part of the grid, enabling the control to
restore frequency synchronization across the whole grid.
It is worth noticing that the extension of the average
connectivity in the communication layer enables remote
generators subject to perturbations to synchronize to
unaffected generators, since the control scheme aims at
synchronizing the frequency of the controlled node to its
neighbors in the communication network, rather that
synchronizing all nodes at a fixed frequency value. In
this way the extended topology enables generators in
the southern part of the grid, usually deeply affected
by perturbations, to synchronize with generators in the
northern part, that do not exhibit strong fluctuations.
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local control topology clocij , where less communication
links are present than in cextij . This is due to the basis
mechanism underlying direct control : it compensates the
deviation of the mean frequency of all nodes connected
to the controlled generator, thus causing the control to
remain inactive when the mean frequency matches the
nominal frequency of the power grid, while not all nodes
are frequency synchronized. On the other hand, this
control scheme may become counterproductive if multi-
ple generators are connected in a chain. If, for example,
we consider the case of three generators connected in a
chain, and the generator at one end adopts a negative
frequency following a perturbation, it turns out that the
middle generator adopts a positive frequency to restore
the mean. The last generator in the chain then in turn
adopts a negative frequency to compensate the middle
one. The generator in the middle then begins compen-
sating its two neighbors, which in turn try to individually
compensate the middle generator. This process leads
to an unbounded increase in both negative and positive
frequencies, which leads to quick desynchronization of
the participating generators. Adding further communi-
cation links in the control topology prevents this, but
also renders the control scheme ineffective as multiple
controlled generators compensate each other instead
of restoring the nominal frequency within the power grid.
Combined control in the local control topology clocij
is governed by its direct control component. Since
synchronization is lost across the grid, but not locally,
difference control is mostly inactive, while the direct
control part is responsible for restoring synchronization
within the grid. The influence of the difference control
becomes visible in the cases where direct control alone
fails in the local topology, due to runaway interactions.
These are successfully prevented by the difference control
component. When additional communication links be-
tween the generators are present (i.e. cextij ), the combined
control is dominated by its difference control component.
In this case the direct control is mostly inactive since the
mean frequency across the two desynchronized regions
of the network is equal to the nominal frequency. The
drawback of applying both control schemes at the same
time emerges when increasing demand of all loads in
the network is implemented simultaneously. For this
perturbation the two control schemes compete against
each other, causing the frequency of the controlled node
to oscillate, instead of being dominated by the more
effective control scheme.
III. DISCUSSION
The study of power grids is of great current interest in
view of the impending termination of nuclear and fossil-
fuel energy and replacement of old power plants with re-
newable energy sources [1]. Wind and photovoltaic power
are the most promising technologies, but their integration
into the grid poses a challenge [3–5], in particular due to
the fluctuation features of renewable power generators
[38, 39] and the impact of energy trading on the network
[18].
Besides these fluctuations it is also necessary to design
modern power grids taking into account the topological
change resulting from the increasing number of renew-
able sources which substitute fossil fuel power plants.
This leads to the question of how the power grid should
be structured and how the stability is modified due to
decentralization. Recent work [40] found that the cost-
minimizing creation of dead-end or dead-tree structures
increases the vulnerability of the power grid to large per-
turbations, while a grid with decentralized power sources
becomes more sensitive to dynamical perturbations, and
simultaneously more robust to topological failures [19].
It is also possible that the addition of new power lines
can decrease the stability of the power grid, which is
known as the Braess’s paradox [41]. Not negligible is
also the role played by single critical nodes (dead-ends or
frequency-deviating), whose desynchronization is likely
to result in a substantial blackout both in lossy [42] and
lossless networks [30].
These aspects present challenges to the stability of the
power grid. During normal operation of the power grid,
the network is in a synchronous state, in which all nodes
run at the nominal frequency of the network (50 Hz or
60 Hz). In case of excess demand, kinetic energy of syn-
chronous generators is converted to electrical energy, thus
decreasing the frequency. In order to cope with excess de-
mand, usually primary control is achieved by the affected
generator detecting this decrease and in turn increasing
its power generation to restore the nominal frequency
[43], but the control of renewable power plants in this
way is less feasible due to their reduced inertia [23, 24].
Finally, even localized events can present a severe dan-
ger to the stability of the whole power grid, by causing a
cascade of failures. Failure can occur due to multiple rea-
sons, such as line overload, voltage collapse or desynchro-
nization [44]. The dynamics of cascading failure, usually
investigated in a monolayer power grid, shows the im-
portance of considering transient dynamics of the order
of few seconds [45] since the distance of a line failure
from the initial trigger and the time of the line failure
are highly correlated.
In this work we have conducted a systematic survey of
controllability of the power grid against a variety of per-
turbations using the Italian grid as proof-of-principle. In
particular we have presented a novel approach by consid-
ering the dynamics of a power grid in a two-layer network
model, using a fully dynamical description for the com-
munication layer. Previous investigations of multiple-
layer power grids have been performed by taking into
account only static nodes without dynamics, focusing on
topological effects [36]. On the other hand, investigations
of the dynamics of the (Italian) power grid are usually
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conducted only in a single layer [30, 46–48], as well as the
investigation of the dynamics of cascading failures [45].
Specifically, here we have modelled the Italian high
voltage power grid as a dynamical two-layer network,
where the dynamics of the power grid layer is described
in terms of the second order Kuramoto model with iner-
tia. On the other hand the second layer, which represents
the communication network, models the dynamic control
signal for each generator.
We present the effects of a variety of different pertur-
bations upon the frequency synchronization of the net-
work. These perturbations model real-life threats to the
stability of the power grid: Sudden failure of generators,
increased demand by consumers, and one or more gen-
erators with stochastic power output fluctuations. The
last of these perturbations is of particular interest, due to
the challenge of replacing fossil fuel energy with renew-
able energy sources in the future. To describe the fluc-
tuating power output of renewable energy power plants
both Gaussian white noise and more realistic intermit-
tent noise have been used.
In the communication layer we have assumed a selec-
tion of different control schemes (control functions fdiffi ,
fdiri and f
comb
i ) and control topologies (adjacency ma-
trices clocij and c
ext
ij ). All control schemes take advan-
tage of the second layer by collecting information from
adjacent nodes described by cij to calculate the control
signal. This can be done either in a local setting (clocij )
where generators possess the same communication links
as in the power grid layer, or in an extended control layer
topology (cextij ) where additional communication links be-
tween all generators are present. We have tested (i) a
control scheme aimed at synchronizing the frequency of
the controlled nodes with their neighbors (difference con-
trol fdiff ), (ii) a control scheme aimed at restoring the
original synchronization frequency in the neighborhood
of the controlled node (direct control fdir), and (iii) a
mixed approach combining both (f comb). The only con-
trol scheme being able to effectively counteract all of the
perturbations is the difference control scheme fdiff in
the extended control topology, while the direct control
has some advantages in the local control topology only.
The investigation of the self-emerging control dynamics
following perturbations has highlighted the role played
by some specific nodes. In the Supplementary Mate-
rial we have calculated the topological properties of the
more vulnerable nodes in the southern region and at the
boundary between north and south, as well as the less
vulnerable nodes in the north-eastern part of the net-
work. The calculation of different topological measures
shows that nodes in the power grid layer which are more
affected by perturbations are not characterized, in gen-
eral, by specific topological features. It turns out that the
Italian power grid can be divided in two specific parts:
the northern, continental part, with a higher average con-
nectivity, which is more resilient to perturbations, and
the southern, peninsular part, characterized by a low av-
erage connectivity. The elongated structure of the south-
ern part makes it less robust to perturbations.
Further work should incorporate time delay in the dy-
namics of the control grid, accounting for the delay in
detecting the frequency of the generators and the delays
during communication between them. Furthermore the
impact of an additional self-inhibiting term in the dif-
ference control on its performance could be investigated.
Finally the perturbations in this work are each applied
separately, but the interaction between them, especially
of the stochastic fluctuations and the steady increase in
demand, would be of interest.
IV. METHODS
A. Power grid layer
The Kuramoto model with inertia describes the phase
and frequency dynamics of N coupled synchronous ma-
chines arranged in the controlled power grid layer, i.e.,
generators or consumers within the power grid, where
mechanical and electrical phase and frequency are as-
sumed to be identical:
mϑ¨i(t) = −ϑ˙i(t) + (Ωi + P ci (t))
+K
N∑
j
aij(t) sin (ϑj(t)− ϑi(t)) , (1)
with the phase ϑi and frequencies ϑ˙i of node i = 1, ..., N .
Both dynamical variables ϑi, ϑ˙i are defined relative to
a frame rotating with the reference power line frequency
(i.e., 50 or 60 Hz). The inherent frequency distribution
is bimodal, where a positive natural frequency Ωi of a
node corresponds to the suitably normalized power sup-
plied by a generator, while a negative natural frequency
corresponds to the demand of a load. The power bal-
ance requires that the power supplied by all generators
in the network is exactly met by the combined demand
of all loads:
∑
i Ωi = 0. The additional term P
c
i de-
notes the control signal supplied by the communication
layer, which serves as an offset to the power supplied by
a controlled generator. We assume homogeneously dis-
tributed transmission capacities K, while m corresponds
to the inertia. The adjacency matrix aij takes the value
1 if node i has a transmission line connected to node j, 0
otherwise. In our numerical simulations we use the Ital-
ian high voltage power grid topology [50], which consists
of N = 127 nodes, of which 34 are generators and 93
are loads. The matrix aij , which describes the topology,
is unweighted and symmetrical (see Fig. 6 (a) for graph
details).
The Kuramoto model with inertia has been derived
in [35] from the swing equation governing the rotors
mechanical dynamics [51], by assuming constant volt-
age amplitude and constant mechanical power Ωi. The
former assumptions mean that the model does not de-
scribe voltage dynamics or the interplay of amplitude and
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FIG. 6. Visualisation of the topology of the individual layers of the two-layer power grid: (a) Topology aij of the power grid
layer based on the real Italian high voltage power grid; (b) control layer topology clocij where the communication links of the
generators are as in the power grid layer; (c) control layer topology cextij where generators possess additional communication
links to all other generators in the network (green). Red nodes denote generators, while blue nodes denote consumers. Position
of nodes has been slightly modified to improve readability.
phase. A more realistic model would include the volt-
age dynamics, thus taking into account the machine’s
electrodynamical behavior, as done by [52]. For sim-
plicity also homogeneous transmission line capacities are
assumed, and losses are neglected. A more realistic ap-
proach would be to use individual transmission capacities
to model different transmission line lengths, and to take
into account sources of dissipation (e.g., Ohmic losses,
and losses caused by damper windings) [51]. However,
the goal of the present paper is to gain insight into the
principal behavior of large power grids depending on the
network topology, and the interplay of the power grid
layer with the communication layer, which is essential
for the control mechanism. Therefore the assumptions
we have made represent a good compromise when look-
ing for universal properties: as always in modeling, the
virtue of a simple model is that we can separate the influ-
ence of different parameters and gain insight by studying
a reduced model, while modelling all the details at the
same time would not give insight, like a black-box brute-
force numerical simulation.
B. Macroscopic indicators and parameter regime
For our investigation we have chosen a regime of bista-
bility in which both the fully frequency-synchronized
state and a partially synchronized state are accessible.
In this way it is possible to mimic the effect of a pertur-
bation applied to the synchronized state; this displaces
the system out of synchrony into an intermediate state
where the operating conditions are not optimal for the
functioning of power grids.
The system has been investigated in absence of con-
trol, by adiabatically varying the coupling strength K
with two different protocols [49, 53]. Namely, for the up-
sweep protocol, the series of simulations is initialized for
the decoupled system by considering random initial con-
ditions both for phases and frequencies (ϑi(0) ∈ [−pi, pi),
ϑ˙i(0) ∈ [−1, 1) at K = 0). Afterwards the coupling
is increased in steps of ∆K until a maximum coupling
strength is reached, where the system shows synchro-
nized behaviour. For each investigated value of K, the
system is initialized with the final conditions found for
the previous coupling value. For the downsweep protocol,
starting from the maximum coupling strength achieved
with the upsweep protocol, the coupling is reduced in
steps of ∆K until the asynchronous state at K = 0 is
reached again. For each investigated coupling value the
system evolves for a transient time tR, until the network
settles and it reaches a steady state. At this point, char-
acteristic measures are calculated, averaging over a time
tA, in order to assess the level of synchronization of the
state {ϑi(tR), ϑ˙i(tR)}. In particular the time-averaged
phase velocity profile 〈ωi〉t ≡ 〈ϑ˙i〉t provides information
about the frequency synchronization of each node, while
the standard deviation of the frequencies
∆ω(t) =
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
j
(ωj(t)− ω(t))2 (2)
gives information about the deviation from complete fre-
quency synchronization at the macroscopic level (ω¯(t)
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represents the instantaneous ensemble-averaged grid fre-
quency). In Fig. 7 (a) we depict the standard deviation
of frequencies, averaged over a time interval tA, 〈∆ω〉t
as a function of the coupling strength K. The difference
between the results obtained for the upsweep protocol
(orange triangles) and the downsweep one (blue trian-
gles) highlights the hysteretic nature of the synchroniza-
tion transition. The phase ordering of the power grid is
0 10 20 30
K
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
t
upsweep
downsweep
0 10 20 30
K
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
R
t
upsweep
downsweep
FIG. 7. Mean synchronization of the power grid without
control, averaged over tA = 1000 after a transient time of
tR = 10000, vs coupling strength K. Upright orange tri-
angles denote upsweep, upside-down blue triangles denote
downsweep. The red vertical dashed line marks K = 6.5.
The synchronization is measured by: (a) mean standard de-
viation of frequency 〈∆ω〉t (frequency synchronization), (b)
mean Kuramoto order parameter 〈R〉t (phase synchroniza-
tion). Parameters: m = 10, bimodal frequency distribu-
tion with Ωload = −1 and Ωgen = 9334 , integration time step
∆t = 0.002, adiabatic increase of K with ∆K = 0.25.
measured by the complex order parameter
R(t)eiΦ(t) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
eiϑj , (3)
where the modulus R(t) ∈ [0, 1] and the argument Φ(t)
indicate the degree of synchrony and mean phase an-
gle, respectively. In the following we will denote R(t) as
global order parameter. In the continuum limit an asyn-
chronous state is characterized by R ≈ 0, while R = 1
corresponds to full phase synchronization. Intermediate
values of R correspond to states with partial or cluster
synchronization. The global order parameter, averaged
in time, is shown as a function of K in Fig. 7 (b). For
small K the state is asynchronous with 〈R〉t ' 1/
√
N ,
then at K ' 6.5 for upsweep 〈R〉t exhibits an abrupt
jump to a finite value, and then it decreases reaching a
minimum at K = 9. For larger K the order parameter
increases steadily with K tending towards the fully phase
synchronized regime, similarly to what was shown in [48]
for a different value of inertia. In this article we have ex-
plored the dynamics of the system at K = 6.5, where the
system shows bistability between full frequency synchro-
nization (i.e., it corresponds to the minimum coupling
strength for which full frequency synchronization is still
achievable) and partial synchronization (〈∆ω〉t ' 1.6),
which models the resulting state when the power grid is
strongly perturbed.
C. Communication layer
The smart grid includes a communication infrastruc-
ture in all the stages of the power system, from transmis-
sion to users, allowing for the design of control strategies
based on the information data flow. In real applications,
we need to consider isolated elements, where synchroniza-
tion needs to be assured such that, if the isolated nodes
are reconnected to the main power system, failures can
be avoided and the stability of the network is preserved.
Therefore, the use of a communication layer of the net-
work may improve the performance of the power system.
We consider two layer topologies or infrastructures, the
physical topology that describes the power system dy-
namics (as shown above in Fig. 6 (a)), and the commu-
nication layer topology, which describes how data from
each node is transmitted (see Fig. 6 (b), (c) for the topolo-
gies of the communication layer investigated here). Both
infrastructures can be conceived as a multilayer network,
as shown in Fig. 8, where for clarity we have chosen the
communication layer topology presented in Fig. 6 (b).
To design a control strategy for synchronization, it is
necessary to collect information from each generator and
its neighbors. Phasor measurement units or sensors pro-
vide information, such that local controllers integrated
with the generator nodes use the information to calculate
a control signal P ci ∈ <. The loads are not controlled.
The control signal can be interpreted as power injection
for positive P ci or power absorption for negative values
of P ci , which is realized using storage devices (e.g., bat-
teries) that can absorb or inject power to the generator
buses [54]. This real-world framework can be translated
in terms of Eq. 1 as injecting power in steady state op-
eration.
Since the communication layer describes the exchange
of information between the nodes about their current dy-
namic states, we consider a control strategy that depends
on the information of the neighbors of each node, from
which a control signal P ci (t) for each controlled node is
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FIG. 8. Graphical illustration of the two-layer network.
Nodes of the power grid (grey) are interconnected with the
nodes of the communication network (orange). Straight blue
lines indicate data flow from the generators to the communica-
tion layer, along with applied control input to the generators.
Dashed blue lines represent data flow only from the loads to
the communication layer.
calculated dynamically. Neighbors can be related using
the adjacency matrix C = {cij} of the communication
layer. Our essential point is that we equip the communi-
cation layer also with a dynamics of its own. Therefore
we propose to determine the control signal P ci (t) by a first
order differential equation depending on the frequencies
ϑ˙j of neighboring nodes within the communication layer
cij :
P˙ ci (t) = Gi fi
(
cij , {ϑ˙j(t)}
)
, (4)
where Gi is the control strength and fi represents the
control function.
a. Control strength We assume that it is possible
to control only the power output of generators in the
network, thus Gi is zero for all loads:
Gi =
{
G , i ∈Mgen
0 , otherwise
(5)
where Mgen is the set of all generators in the network.
Throughout this work we choose G = 0.04.
b. Topology cij Two different topologies have been
considered for the communication layer, namely clocij and
cextij . In the local topology c
loc
ij the connections between
each generator and the other nodes in the communication
layer correspond to the connections in the power grid
layer (i.e., the communication layer network consists of
a subnetwork of the power grid layer which contains all
links of the generators in the power grid), except that
each node has available also the information about itself,
so that the diagonal elements of the adjacency matrix
are nonzero. The local topology is thus described by the
adjacency matrix
clocij =
{
1 , i = j
aij , otherwise
. (6)
As only generators receive a control signal P ci , all loads
which are not connected to a generator can be dis-
regarded in the communication layer, as illustrated in
Fig. 6 (b).
For the extended control topology cextij additional links
between all generators are present (see Fig. 6 (c)). The
globally coupled generators represent a subset of the com-
munication layer (which additionally contains the neigh-
boring loads); this provides an exchange of information
between all generator control stations. The correspond-
ing connectivity matrix is defined as
cextij =
{
1 , i ∧ j ∈Mgen
clocij , otherwise
. (7)
c. Control function fi The dynamics of the control
signal by Eq. (4) is governed by the control function
fi
(
cij , {ϑ˙j}
)
. In this work we consider three different
control functions: the first one is to apply a control signal
that is proportional to the frequency difference between
node i and its neighbors [34]
fdiffi
(
cij , {ϑ˙j(t)}
)
=
N∑
j
cij
(
ϑ˙j(t)− ϑ˙i(t)
)
. (8)
We refer to this control scheme as difference control.
The second approach is to apply a control signal that
aims to restore power balance in the neighborhood of the
controlled node:
fdiri
(
cij , {ϑ˙j(t)}
)
= − 1
Ni
N∑
j
cij ϑ˙j(t) . (9)
Here Ni gives the number of direct neighbors of node i
in cij . We will call this control scheme direct control.
The final control scheme is a combination of both differ-
ence and direct control:
f combi
(
cij , {ϑ˙j(t)}
)
=
N∑
j
cij
(
a
(
ϑ˙j(t)− ϑ˙i(t)
)
− b ϑ˙j(t)
Ni
)
.
(10)
Here a and b are weight factors of the two components.
In all further instances we will assume that a = b = 1.
We will refer to this control scheme as combined control.
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D. Perturbations
We apply a selection of different perturbations to the
network in order to test the efficiency of the control
schemes. In the following the different kinds of pertur-
bations are listed and discussed.
a. Disconnecting generators. The perturbed gener-
ator i is disconnected from all its neighbors in both the
power grid layer and the communication layer for a time
interval Tp. This perturbation can be expressed in terms
of the adjacency matrices of the power grid layer aij in
Eq. (1) and of the communication layer cij in Eq. (4):{
aij (t) = aji (t) = 0
cij (t) = cji (t) = 0
t ∈ TP . (11)
This kind of perturbation represents a critical failure of
a power plant.
b. Generators with fluctuating power output. Con-
ventional power plants, whose power output is constant
in time, and adjustable to the current demand, are pro-
gressively being replaced by stochastically fluctuating re-
newable energies like wind and solar. To represent the
impact of renewable energy sources we investigate the
impact of stochastic feed-in both with Gaussian charac-
teristics and with more realistic properties (i.e., temporal
correlations, realistic power spectrum and intermittent
increment statistics).
Fluctuating power output can be modelled by modify-
ing the natural frequency Ωi of the targeted generator i
by adding a stochastic term ΩN (t)
Ωi(t) = Ωgen + ΩN (t) . (12)
In particular, the stochastic term ΩN (t) is chosen (i)
as Gaussian white noise and (ii) as intermittent noise. In
case of Gaussian white noise
ΩN (t) =
√
2Dξ(t) , (13)
where ξ is a δ-correlated Gaussian random variable, char-
acterized by its noise intensity D.
On the other hand, intermittent noise
ΩN (t) = µx(t) (14)
is characterized by the penetration parameter µ and the
intermittent noise series x(t), whose generation is de-
scribed in the following paragraph. The main difference
between intermittent noise and Gaussian white noise is
that intermittent noise is highly correlated in time, and
has fat tails at short correlation times, while Gaussian
white noise does not show heavy tails nor any time cor-
relation. This means that on short timescales extreme
events are more likely to occur if intermittent noise is
implemented.
c. Generation of intermittent noise. Due to atmo-
spheric turbulence, wind power has specific turbulent
characteristics [9, 38], such as extreme events, time cor-
relations, Kolmogorov power spectrum, and intermittent
increment statistics. In particular the increment proba-
bility density functions of real wind power data signifi-
cantly deviate from Gaussianity and its power spectrum
displays (5/3)-decay with some discrepancy in the high
frequency range. Based on this, we generate intermittent
power time series x(t) according to the synthetique feed-
in noise generation detailed by Schmietendorf et al. in
[39]. The first step in generating the intermittent noise
time series is to consider the dynamics of the following
Langevin-type system of equations:
z˙(t) = z(t)
(
g − z(t)
z0
)
+
√
Iz2(t)y(t) , (15)
y˙(t) = −γy(t) + ξ(t) , (16)
where y(t) represents colored noise generated by an Orn-
steinUhlenbeck process [55, 56] with a correlation time
τOU = 1/γ and with a δ-correlated Gaussian white noise
term ξ. The parameter I controls the intermittency
strength, while the other parameters γ = 1.0, g = 0.5
and z0 = 2.0 are chosen as in [39]. In a second step
the time series z(t) is transformed, so that its power
spectrum resembles more closely the power spectrum of
wind power plants. To achieve this, the Fourier trans-
form X(f) = FT [z(t)] (f) is first divided by its ampli-
tude spectrum. This process eliminates the amplitude
information of X(f), but retains its phase information.
Subsequently a weight function h(f) is used in order to
make the spectrum of the series similar to the empirical
data:
Xˆ(f) =
X(f)
|X(f)|h
1
2 (f) . (17)
The power spectrum of Xˆ(f) is proportional to the
weight function. Finally Xˆ is transformed back into the
time domain: x˜(t) = FT−1[Xˆ(f)](t). Due to the elim-
ination of amplitude information the amplitude of x˜ is
freely scalable. The standard deviation σx˜ of the aggre-
gated distribution of x˜ is rescaled to any desired σx:
x(t) =
σx
σx˜
x˜(t) . (18)
Since 〈x(t)〉 = 0, 〈Ωi(t)〉 = Ωgen and power balance is
maintained on long-time average.
Further restrictions are introduced to make this per-
turbation more realistic. A lower boundary for x is in-
troduced, so that a generator cannot operate as a load
in the network due to the influence of noise: all values
x < −1 are truncated to x = −1. Furthermore a power
feed-in cut-off is assumed, which means that generators
have a maximum power output they can supply: all val-
ues x > 1 are truncated to x = 1. This additionally
truncates some of the extreme events in the strongly in-
termittent power time series, while the mean and stan-
dard deviation are nonetheless almost unaffected by this.
With these constraints for x, the penetration parameter
µ is chosen equal to the natural frequency Ωi of the af-
fected generator.
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Throughout this work we fix I = 2, h(f) = f−
5
3 and
σx =
1
3 for intermittent noise.
d. Increasing demand of loads. First, when target-
ing a single load i, it is subjected to an instantaneous
increase in demand. This is realized by increasing its
natural frequency to |Ωpert| > |Ωload| for the duration
of the perturbation Tp, where Ωload < 0 gives the natu-
ral frequency of the load during normal operation of the
power grid. Then the perturbation is
Ωi(t) =
{
Ωpert , t ∈ TP
Ωload , otherwise
. (19)
Furthermore, we investigate the effect of steadily increas-
ing the demand of all loads simultaneously. For all loads
experiencing the perturbation, the evolution of the nat-
ural frequency is described by
Ωi(t) =

Ωload , t < tstart
Ωload + (Ωpert − Ωload) t−tstarttend−tstart , tstart ≤ t ≤ tend
Ωpert , t < tend
, (20)
where tstart denotes the time when the demand of all
loads begins to increase and tend denotes the time when
the final value of demand is reached.
This perturbation is suited to represent a change in con-
sumer behavior due to external circumstances such as,
e.g., dawn and dusk, or hot and cold weather.
E. Numerical integration
To integrate Eqs. (1), (4) and solve the dynamics of the
system, we use the fourth order Runge-Kutta-algorithm
[57] with an integration time step of ∆t = 0.002. When
applying noise to the system the integration scheme is
changed according to the applied noise scheme. For in-
termittent noise Eq. (18), the noise series xi(t) affecting
a single node are pre-calculated and used in Eq. (1) as a
modification of the generator’s constant power input, see
Eq. (14). The dynamics is solved by simply applying a
fourth order Runge-Kutta integration scheme with a time
step of ∆t = 0.001. When applying Gaussian white noise
to the generators, we cannot use the standard Runge-
Kutta methods, therefore we employ a method similar to
the secondorder RungeKutta, which has been developed
in [57] on the basis of the Heun algorithm. For the latter
algorithm we use an integration time step of ∆t = 0.001.
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